The consistency formula for set theory can be stated in terms of the free-variables theory of primitive recursive maps. Free-variable p. r. predicates are decidable by set theory, main result here, built on recursive evaluation of p. r. map codes and soundness of that evaluation in set theoretical frame: internal p. r. map code equality is evaluated into set theoretical equality. So the free-variable consistency predicate of set theory is decided by set theory, ω-consistency assumed. By Gödel's second incompleteness theorem on undecidability of set theory's consistency formula by set theory under assumption of this ω-consistency, classical set theory turns out to be ω-inconsistent.
Primitive recursive maps
Define the theory PR of objects and p. r. maps as follows recursively as a subsystem of set theory T :
• the objects ½ = {0}, AE, AE × AE, . . . , A, . . . , B, A × B etc.
• the map constants 0 : ½ → AE (zero), s = s(n) = n+1 (successor ), id A : A → A (identities), Π : A → ½ (terminal maps), l = l(a, b) = a : A × B → A, r = r(a, b) = b : A × B → B (left and right projections);
• closure against (associative) map composition,
• closure against forming the induced map (f, g) = (f, g)(c) = (f (c), g(c)) : C → A × B into a product, for given components f : C → A, g : C → B, l • (f, g) = f, r • (f, g) = g;
• closure against forming the iterated map
Furthermore PR is to inherit from T uniqueness of the initialised iterated, in order to inherit uniqueness in the following full schema of primitive recursion:
+uniqueness of such p. r. defined map f.
This schema allows in particular construction of for loops, for i := 1 to n do. . .od as for verification if a given text (code) is an (arithmetised) proof of a given coded assertion, Gödel's p. r. formula 45. xBy, x ist Beweis von y.
(Formel 46. Bew y = ∃xBy, x is provable, is not p. r.)
PR code sets and evaluation
The map code set-set of gödel numbers-we want to evaluate
PR the set of p. r. map codes from A to B.
Together with evaluation on suitable arguments it is recursively defined as follows:
• Basic map constants ba in PR : (u, a) ).
•
(induced map code into a product),
This recursion terminates in set theory T, with correct results:
Objectivity Theorem: Evaluation ev is objective, i. e. for f : A → B in PR we have
Proof by substitution of codes of PR maps into code variables u, v ∈ PR ⊂ AE in the above double recursive definition of evaluation, in particular:
recursively, and
recursively.
PR soundness within set theory
Notion f = PR g of p. r. maps is externally p. r. enumerated, by complexity of (binary) deduction trees. Internalising-formalising-gives an internal notion of PR equality,
coming by kth internal equation proved by kth internal deduction tree dtree k .
PR evaluation soundness theorem framed by set theory T : For p. r. theory PR with its internal notion of equality '=' we have:
(i) PR to T evaluation soundness:
Substituting in the above "concrete" PR codes into u resp. v, we get, by objectivity of evaluation ev :
(ii) T-framed objective soundness of PR :
(iii) Specialising to case f : = χ : A → ¾ = {0, 1} a p. r.
predicate, and to g : = true, we get T-framed logical soundness of PR :
If a p. r. predicate is-within T-PR-internally provable, then it holds in T for all of its arguments.
Proof by primitive recursion on k, dtree k the k th deduction tree of the theory, proving its root equation u= k v. These (argument-free) deduction trees are counted in lexicographical order.
Super Case of equational internal axioms, in particular
• associativity of (internal) composition:
This proves assertion (•) in present associativity-of-composition case.
• Analogous proof for the other flat, equational cases, namely reflexivity of equality, left and right neutrality of identities, all substitution equations for the map constants, Godement's equations for the induced map: • proof of (•) for the last equational case, the
Iteration step, case of genuine iteration equation
u $ ⊙ id # s = u⊙u $ , # the internal cartesian product of map codes:
Proof of termination-conditioned inner soundness for the remaining genuine Horn case axioms, of form
Transitivity-of-equality case
Evaluate at argument a ∈ A and get in fact
(by hypothesis on u, v)
transitivity export q. e. d. in this case.
Compatibility case of composition with equality,
by hypothesis on u= u ′ and by Leibniz' substitutivity in T, q. e. d. in this first compatibility case.
Case of composition with equality in second composition factor,
( * ) holds by v= v ′ , induction hypothesis on v, v ′ , and Leibniz' substitutivity: same argument put into equal maps. This proves soundness assertion (•) in this 2nd compatibility case.
(Redundant) Case of compatibility of forming the induced map, with equality, is analogous to compatibilities above, even easier, since the two map codes concerned are independent from each other what concerns their domains.
(Final) Case of Freyd's (internal) uniqueness of the initialised iterated, is case
Comment: w is here an internal comparison candidate fullfilling the same internal p. r. equations as the initialised iterated v $ ⊙ u# id . It should be -is: soundness -evaluated equal to the latter, on A × AE.
Soundness assertion (•) for the present Freyd's uniqueness case recurs on= i ,= j turned into predicative equations '=', these being already deduced, by hypothesis on i, j < k. Further ingredients are transitivity of '=' and established properties of evaluation ev .
So here is the remaining -inductive -proof, prepared by
as well as
the same being true for w ′ : = v $ ⊙ u# id in place of w, once more by (characteristic) double recursive equations for ev , this time with respect to the initialised internal iterated itself.
(0) and (s) put together for both then show, by induction on iteration count n ∈ AE-all other free variables u, v, w, a together form the passive parameter for this induction-soundness assertion (•) for this Freyd's uniqueness case, namely
Induction runs as follows:
Anchor n = 0 :
q. e. d.
PR-predicate decision
We consider here PR predicates for decidability by set theorie(s) T. Basic tool is T-framed soundness of PR just above, namely
Within T define for χ : A → ¾ out of PR a partially defined (alleged, individual) µ-recursive decision ∇χ : ½ ⇀ ¾ by first fixing decision domain
Cantor count of A; and then, with (partial) recursive µD : ½ ⇀ AE within T :
[ This (alleged) decision is apparently µ-recursive within T, even if apriori only partially defined.]
There is a first consistency problem with this definition: are the defined cases disjoint?
Yes, within frame theory T which soundly frames theory PR :
We show now, that decision ∇χ is totally defined, the undefined case does not arise, this for T ω-consistent in Gödel's sense. These two subcases are disjoint, disjoint here by T-framed soundness of theory PR which reads
here in particular -substitute t : ½ → AE into k free:
So furthermore, by this framed soundness, in present subcase:
• 2nd case, derived non-termination:
[ then in particular T ⊢ ∀a¬χ(a) = false, so T ⊢ ∀aχ(a) in this case ], and furthermore
in this case.
• 3rd, remaining, ill case is:
but is nevertheless not empty. 
and "nevertheless" for each p. r. point p :
We rule out the latter -general -possibility of a nonempty predicate without p. r. points, for frame theory T by gödelian assumption of ω-consistency. In fact it rules out above instance of ω-inconsistency: all numerals 0, 1, 2, . . . are p. r. points. Hence it rules out -in quasi-decidability abovepossibility (c) for decision domain D = D χ ⊆ AE of decision operator ∇ for predicate χ : A → ¾, and we get Decidability theorem: Each free-variable p. r. predicate χ : A → ¾ gives rise to the following complete case distinction by set theory T :
Under assumption of ω-consistency for T :
• T ⊢ ∀aχ(a) (theorem) or
Now take here for predicate χ, T's own free-variable p. r. consistency formula
Con T = ¬ Prov T (k, false ) : AE → ¾, and get, under assumption of ω-consistency for T, a consistency decision ∇ Con T for T by T. This contradiction to (the postcedent of) Gödel's 2nd Incompleteness theorem shows that the assumption of ω-consistency for set theories T must fail:
Set theories T are ω-inconsistent.
This concerns all classical set theories as in particular PM, ZF, and NGB. The reason is ubiquity of formal quantification within these (arithmetical) theories.
Problem: Does it concern Peano Arithmetic either?
